

ABSTRACTS

[in geographical disorder]



1. WORLD ORDER AND ABENDLAND: HEIDEGGER ON GLOBAL RENEWAL

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The paper argues that, for Heidegger, the transition from the present global disorder to an ‘other’ global future requires a basic ‘turning’ (*Kehre*, *Umkehr*) in both inter-human and inter-national relations. The paper takes its departure from Heidegger’s comments on global politics written during the time of the Nazi regime and the Second World War. The gist of these comments was a radical critique of totalizing power (power for power’s sake) and technical fabrication (*Machenschaft*). For Heidegger, the modern West has been deeply embroiled in the glorification of anthropocentric power over the globe. In some of his writings after the war, Heidegger adumbrated ‘other’ possibilities for what he now called the ‘Evening Land’ (*Abendland*), possibilities anchored in ‘letting-be’ and a pervasive openness to ‘*Ereignis*’. By way of conclusion, I ponder some implications of his thought for contemporary global renewal.

2. THINKING THE CLEARING IN THE AGE OF THE EARTH SYSTEM

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The principal problem, for Heidegger, with the ‘Age of the World Picture’ is that it leaves no place for ‘the clearing’: the world is to be represented and manipulated, not dwelt in. The world in turn comes to be understood as a ‘system,’ a literal translation of Heidegger’s concept of *Gestell* (De Beistegui

2005), and more specifically as an ‘Earth System’ containing physical, biological and human components. To complicate matters further, anthropogenic perturbations of this system are widely considered to pose an existential threat to humankind. This raises an intriguing question: could it be precisely this existential threat that may make Heideggerian phenomenology relevant to contemporary humanity? An affirmative answer, I believe, may come from the rapidly expanding field of biomimicry, which takes Nature as our “model, measure, and mentor.” As biomimicry has grown, it has given rise to the project of building “biomimetic cities” (Schuiten 2010, Despommier 2011, Lovelock 2014) and in particular the idea that we should “imagine a building like a tree and a city like a forest” (Braungart and McDonough, 2002). It is in this context, I believe, that Heideggerian phenomenology could become existentially relevant, for in addition to imagining “buildings like trees” and “cities like forests,” we could also make space for dwelling by re-imagining the urban agora “like a clearing in the forest.” This would allow us to maintain the agora as the democratic and open space which makes possible all ‘categorization’ from Gk. “kata-” (against) + “agora” (open, public space) of both beings and Being, and yet this “agora-clearing” would no longer be at the mercy of the human will i.e., democracy, for it would, by definition, have to accommodate itself to the surrounding “city-forest,” thus giving rise to an ecological democracy.

3. AUTHENTIC BEING AND/IN THE GLOBAL

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This paper will explore different interpretations of the notion of authenticity, or ‘authentic being’, and how they place such *Dasein* in relationship with the ‘global’. I will first address three ethical and analytical critiques of the notion of ‘authenticity’. First, in light of Heidegger’s affinity with the project of National Socialism, it is seen as dangerous jargon leading to discrimination and violence. Second, the notion appears to sit uneasily with the rejection of foundationalism or essentialism in postmodern theorizing, which overlaps, thirdly, with empirical studies showing that the idea of a singular or unique identity is an illusion. While acknowledging the validity and importance of these critiques, I argue that we nevertheless need to investigate the concept of authenticity and the meanings it obtains in social-political life, especially given the persistence of nationalism and, more generally, the popular demand for authentic ways of being in the age of ‘globalisation’.

Against this backdrop, I discuss four readings of authentic being, starting with Heidegger's classic reading of it as an experience of being-towards-death in a moment of singularization, understood as a withdrawal from the world of the globalized Man. I juxtapose this with a second reading of Heidegger, which interprets authentic being as a form of accepting and embracing the multiple and dispersed nature of being in the world. A third reading locates authenticity in Schmitt's state of exception, that is, in making (a decision about) the friend/enemy distinction from the local to the global scale. In another juxtaposition, I then present the reading of authentic being as a feeling obtained in a struggle for recognition in an intimate relationship of either enmity or, I argue, most powerfully friendship. I will ask how each of these readings of authentic being grows out of and, in turn, affects the 'global' aspect of human existence, thus also laying out the implications for whether we conceive of them as (in)compatible modes of being.

4. WITHDRAWAL OF BEING AND THE CONTRACTION OF GOD. HEIDEGGER AND SCHOLEM ON THE UNIVOCITY OF BEING

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This essay explores the Heideggerian notion of the 'withdrawal of Being' (*Entzug des Seins*). Although Heidegger himself was reluctant to discuss it in theological terms (since, as he believed, theology, being a part of the onto-theological complex, always favoured beings at the expense of Being), the comparison with the Judeo-Christian motif of the 'Hidden God' or the 'God in Retreat' seems unavoidable. Especially that exactly at the same time, Gershom Scholem, in his studies on Kabbalah, introduces the concept of the 'nothingness of revelation,' the meaning of which derives from the Lurianic idea of *tsimsum* or 'God's contraction.' According to Scholem, Isaac Luria's divine contraction has to be understood primarily in terms of withdrawal, and as such constitutes one of the first modern images of kenotic creation, in which God 'empties' himself into the world, by 'making room' for something else to spring into existence – long before Hegel and German Idealism. But it can also be understood as God's disappearance, retreat into *Verborgenheit*, refusal to participate and justify the course of the fallen world.

The theological context of the discussion, therefore, lies firmly within the opposition between *analogia entis* and *univocatio entis*: the premodern line of Thomas of Aquinas clashing with the modern line of Duns Scotus. It will be my aim to prove that Heidegger's interest in this debate, which he tackled in his *Habilitationschrift*, continues long after his self-avowed break with

theology and informs his late thoughts on the ‘withdrawal of Being.’ For these thoughts are surrounded by a characteristic ambivalence, which can already be detected in his early dissertation; an ambivalence akin to the one displayed by Scholem. On the one hand, Being/God withdraws in order to liberate the world (which is the version advocated by the followers of the ‘univocity of being’) – on the other, however, Being/God withdraws by occluding his traces still present in the world (which is the version championed by the followers of the ‘analogy of being’). While the former withdrawal may be seen as a deliberate and altogether positive process, thanks to which the world acquires ontological autonomy – the latter withdrawal suggests confusion and obfuscation leading to the negative *Seins(Gottes)vergesenheit*. I would like to analyze this ambivalence – first in Heidegger’s own writings, from his dissertation up to his latest works, and then in juxtaposition with Scholem’s reflections on ‘modern Jewish theology’ – and finally attempt a solution in which I will argue for the contemporary variant of the univocity in which the ‘abandonment by Being’ (*Seinsverlassenheit*) plays a crucial part (Deleuze, Nancy, Agamben).

5. ENVIRONMENTAL (IN)ACTION IN THE AGE OF THE WORLD PICTURE

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Over 20 years ago the Programme Director of Greenpeace UK identified the primary challenge facing the modern environmental movement as that of moving beyond the “struggle for proof” to generating effective environmental action. There is a mass of widely accepted evidence to support environmentalist claims, but effective environmental action is rare, both at governmental and at grass-roots levels. Arguably, the malaise is less a political one than an ontological one. We “know” that environmental problems are “real”, but we fail to grasp them as happening here, to us. It is as if they unfolded in a “media-only reality” (Rose, 1993).

This ontological malaise can be understood along Heideggerian lines as a form of world-alienation. Alienation is often understood, following Marx, as estrangement from our true human nature, consequent on interpreting ourselves as mere resources. On Heidegger’s view however, self and world are inextricably linked. Conscious beings are not trapped inside their own heads, never to bridge the gap to the world outside. Rather, consciousness just is the intentional reaching out to things. Heidegger’s view of the self-world relation implies a modified concept of alienation. Our alienated condition stems as much from interpreting the world around us as a mere resource as it does from interpreting ourselves as mere resources. We may

understand the natural systems on which our lives depend in far more detail than our grandparents did; but where those systems are understood as brute agglomerations of objects the resulting knowledge is alienated and alienating. Our very theory of the real serves to make the earth unreal for us. This, I argue, is the true import of Heidegger's concern with the world "conceived and grasped as picture." It also illuminates his remark in the 1966 *Der Spiegel* interview: "It is no longer an earth on which human beings live today."

6. DWELLING WITH CARE: RE-ARRANGING THE "SCHEME OF THINGS" IN THE ANTHROPOCENE

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Contemporary political thought has employed the ancient Greek concept of *ēthos* to refer to the collective spirit that prevails in a polity. However, it has paid little attention to Heidegger's contribution to the topic. This paper proposes that Heidegger's idea of dwelling can inform the conceptualisation of *ēthos* in a way that proves pertinent to the task of envisioning a more just re-arrangement of the "scheme of things", particularly as a response to the problem of resources scarcity that characterises the Anthropocene. Towards this direction, the paper takes on Heidegger's ontological scrutiny into "original ethics" and proposes that we grasp *ēthos* as a particular mode of dwelling in the world, whereby one engages world affairs — affairs that concern human beings — with care. Yet, the paper explains, care itself is insufficient to inform our dwelling in the Earth given the challenge of natural resources scarcity. Rather, care needs to be coupled with the disposition to pursue justice, which is here affirmed as *dike*. We are human, "dwellers," because we care to achieve a more just, that is less hubristic, re-arrangement of the "scheme of things."

7. HEIDEGGER'S HEGEL, THE CHRISTIAN JEW: 'EUROPE' AS PLANETARY CRIMINALITY AND MACHINATION

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With the publication of Martin Heidegger's 'Black Notebooks' (volumes 94–97 of the Heidegger *Gesamtausgabe*), Heidegger's credibility as a European and global thinker has once again, and more gravely, come into question.

Heidegger's astonishing claims about "the peculiar predetermination of Jewishness for planetary criminality" (a phrase, according to Peter Trawny, omitted by Fritz Heidegger from the published edition of vol. 69 of the Heidegger *Gesamtausgabe*) can be found echoed in these notebooks. Yet foremost among the 'Christian Jewishness' that Heidegger identifies must be counted the thought of Hegel, the one whose "destructive" metaphysics, he tells us, is completed "through Marx", and that stands opposed to "the first beginning with the Greeks". Hegel, even more than Marx, can be said to be the first 'planetary' thinker of Western metaphysics, in that he is the first to realise absolute subjectivity as an absolute politics, and yet all too little attention has been paid to Heidegger's engagement with Hegel. How is Heidegger's "anti-Jewishness" to be understood? Must Heidegger now, and once and for all, be set aside? Or could Hegel help us to read Heidegger again?

8. ŽIŽEK AND HEIDEGGER: ON POLITICAL AND NON-POLITICAL ACTION

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Žižek has over the last decade attempted to rehabilitate Heidegger's work from the 1930's as a model for political action. As his engagement with National Socialism indicates, Heidegger at this stage was open to the possibility that a certain political system or political act might prove adequate to the contemporary epoch in being's history, and to bring about a new one. Thus, Žižek finds in Heidegger's middle period a way to understand how the human being can precipitate a revolutionary event. We shall wonder if in fact the model of action which Žižek wishes to employ is to be found not in the middle Heidegger but in the later, and here it takes a form which is not obviously political, and man's role in relation to the event is one of preparation rather than active initiation. We shall ask if the lesson of the later Heidegger when it comes to revolutionary change is that this action will be neither political nor centred upon the interests and emancipation of man.

9. TECHNOLOGY, ANIMALITY AND GLOBAL BIOPOLITICS: RE-TURNING TO HEIDEGGER

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Recent literature has sought to read key biopolitical moments into Heidegger's writing, particularly with regard to technology and animality (Campbell, 2011; Wolfe, 2010). On the former, Heidegger is often criticised for elaborating a notion of politics as technology that too readily leads to deterministic, inescapable, essentialist or negative conclusions. On the latter, Heidegger's definition of animal-being in terms of *lack* in relation to human-being opens him up to a charge of deep anthropocentrism. These difficulties can be seen to haunt many biopolitical accounts as well, where an inevitable drift towards the thanatopolitical is sometimes prioritised over more affirmative possibilities for the concept of life, or where the focus on *human* life as that which is most readily caught by biopolitical forms of governmentality, misses the way animals or nature have also become objects of modern politics. In this paper, I want to suggest that a re-turn to Heidegger's oeuvre can offer some possible responses to these problematics that lie at the heart of both his own work and biopolitical theory. By reading David Wills' (2008) trope of the dorsal turn, the turn in technology that always happens behind the back and out of view, in tandem with Heidegger's own account of the turn in the essence of technology, the turn of *Gestell*, it is possible to complicate any simple division between negative or affirmative accounts of biopolitics or any easy distinctions between the animal, the machine and the human. By highlighting the figure of the turn, Heidegger's thought becomes a pathway into the unforeseen, surprising and wholly other possibilities that may yet come from the site of the animal and the technological. A fuller account of the (dorsal) turn can therefore offer fertile grounds for engaging anew with some of the most troubling and provocative elements of both Heideggerian and biopolitical discourse.

10. GLOBALISATION, HEIDEGGER AND THE "EAST ASIAN WORLD" IS HEIDEGGER STILL RELEVANT?

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Heidegger's interest in various traditions of thought, such as Daoism and Buddhism, is understood in the context of his overall critique of technology and his perception of it as relating to the western tradition of metaphysics. While these interests are well-attested to by the works of Reinhard May and Graham Parkes, the rise of China as a technological and economic power,

which should appear equally problematic to Heidegger, is still largely unexamined.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the continued relevance and extended significance of Heidegger's thought in the context of contemporary globalisation. I will consider his conception of "Europeanisation" ("*Europäisierung*") mentioned in *Dialogue on Language Between a Japanese and an Inquirer* as central to this approach. Firstly, I will outline what Heidegger means by this phenomenon. Then, I will investigate how contemporary China might be considered Europeanised in Heidegger's sense. I will argue that contemporary Chinese nationalism ideologically appropriates aspects of traditional Chinese thought, in particular Confucianism, into a project based upon technological mastery and optimisation of resources. Rather than standing as a counter weight to Europeanisation, I will demonstrate that it ought to be understood as a continuation and extension of Europeanisation as Heidegger understood it.

This paper finally suggests that Heidegger's dialogue with non-western traditions should be read as his attempt to disrupt the appropriations of Chinese and Japanese traditions that impose technocratic or other western notions upon them. His aim is rather to recover elements within these traditions that are mostly marginalised or excluded from global discourse. The relevance of this dialogue has been increased as contemporary globalisation extends Europeanisation still further. This opportunity opens the possibilities to challenge the hegemony of technology and Europeanisation at its foundation by means of Heidegger's thought. This paper thus calls for Post-Heideggerian scholarship to continue Heidegger's dialogue as a critical approach to globalisation.

11. A UNIVERSAL RIGHT TO POLITICS: THINKING HEIDEGGER'S NOTION OF *GELASSENHEIT* AS POLITICAL AGENCY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

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Certainly the contemporary globalized world is governed by the free market ideology of the free mobility of capital and goods, but not the free movement of labor. This leads to the paradox that that social-political spaces are economically open to the world, yet closed from the point of view of citizenship and political rights, the latter remaining bound to the sovereign will of the nation-state. My lecture argues that Heidegger's notion of *Gelassenheit* allows for rethinking a universal right to politics in the era of globalization. My lecture will begin by taking up the ways in which globalization transforms the way in which universality, especially in the

context of the political, is understood. I will then examine how Heidegger's notion of *Gelassenheit* allows for rethinking political agency as a set of actions, forces, and struggles not tied to an individual or sovereign will. This in turn allows for rethinking a conception of citizenship and political rights. In conclusion I argue that *Gelassenheit* must be thought alongside Heidegger's notion of the "Open" and that together these two terms allow for thinking a universal right to politics.

12. AN EN-FRAMED ISLAMISM? PROLEGOMENA TO ANALYZING CONTEMPORARY TRANSNATIONAL ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS IN LIGHT OF HEIDEGGER'S TAKE ON THE ESSENCE OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY

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This paper presents some preliminary reflections on current international affairs in connection with transnational Islamist movements, in light of Heidegger's meditations on the unfolding of the essence of modern technology. This line of inquiry will focus on interrelated themes that pertain to thinking about being and nihilism, the gathering of divinities with mortals on earth and under the sky into an essential oneness in dwelling, the consideration of martyrdom in connection with being-towards-death, and the en-framed modes of saying and thinking that command some contemporary forms of reading scripture. Such analytics intersect various strands in my own research in phenomenology and ontology, Islamic intellectual history, and architectural humanities. The aim behind them is to shed light on some aspects of contemporary Islamism that are not accounted for in political investigations or in religious studies, it is also meant to test the limits and promises of Heidegger's ontological account of the unfolding of the essence of modern technology as en-framing.

13. WHO IS THE PEASANT WOMAN WEARING VAN GOGH'S OLD BOOTS? HEIDEGGER, LEVINAS, RANCIÈRE ON ART, PHILOSOPHY, AND POLITICS

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The aim of this paper is to approach Heidegger's account of the work of art in the context of the accounts provided by Levinas and Rancière, drawing on the latter in order to take a critical distance from Heidegger.

Heidegger's rethinking of temporality and ontology opened up the possibility of thinking the essence of the work of art not in terms of an ontological distinction etched in some timeless dividing line differentiating objects of art from other things for all eternity. He thought the essence of the artwork rather as an event, a happening, a granting, a clearing, but also as a withdrawing or refusal of truth: truth as concealment and unconcealment, as *aletheia*. The truth of artwork is historical.

Yet Heidegger's views are circumscribed by certain residual, cultural attachments to ideas that remain critically unexamined in his work. I suggest that while he wants to move away from the conventions of thinking art in relation to genius, to form and matter, and all its attendant distinctions, he remains entrenched in the metaphysical trappings of race, gender and class that confine his attention to taking seriously only certain types of art, only a highly restricted notion of who qualifies as an artist. While he wants to get away from the idea of the artist as cause of the artwork, he remains attached to it through his failure to question as radically as he might the cultural assumptions that remain invisibly embedded in his account of the work of art.

14. THE GLOBAL AGE AS WORLD PICTURE?

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This essay revisits Heidegger's essay, 'The Age of the World Picture'. Does our global age conform to what Heidegger describes as world picture? If so, in what ways does it do so, and how have those ways changed since the publication of Heidegger's essay? Recall that Heidegger is careful to note that, "world picture...does not mean a picture of the world but the world conceived and grasped as picture"? Here, Heidegger is addressing the very nature of representation as such. What then is a 'picture'? Or, more specifically, what conception of 'picture' does Heidegger's essay assume? How indebted is it to the transformation of visualization that took place, from the Renaissance through to the Baroque, with the introduction of linear perspective, geometry and algorism. Specifically, how baroque, in terms of the tight integration of art, science and rule, is Heidegger's conception of 'world picture'? How has visualization changed subsequently, with the triangulation of art, science and rule contrived through the age of digital reproduction and algorithmic manipulation? However dense and sophisticated a reflection, Heidegger's essay remains a sketch in which the widest possible diagnostic claims are advanced. They embrace modern science and machine technology of course. But, in as much as Heidegger also distinguishes world picture by 'the loss of the gods', it includes

Christianity in its compass as well: “Christianity has the greatest share in bringing it about.” At issue in the crisis of representation to which Heidegger addresses himself in this seminal essay is, therefore, also the triangulation of truth, religion and politics. Nothing could be more central to the rules of truth and truths of rule obtaining throughout our global age. But how do they obtain, now, in an age that continues to witness astonishing transformations in the arts of representation in general and of visualization in particular?

15. “LIFTING THE VEIL OF ISIS”: ON THE ALTERNATIVE MODERNITY OF EARLY ROMANTICISM

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Martin Heidegger’s diagnosis of modernity retains all its *actualité*. His wise observation that science and technology disconnected from language and poetry can turn the human person into a thing (*Ding*), a product, a standing-reserve (*Bestand*) has arguably come to pass. However, it is far from clear that Heidegger’s conception of ontology provides a genuine alternative to the ideas that underpin capitalist globalisation. His reliance on univocity, coupled with his rejection of theology, locks his philosophy into the same iron cage of abstract, general categories that brought about the dominant strands of modernity. This paper argues that the much-derided (and often poorly understood) tradition of Romanticism charts an alternative modernity, which develops a newly associationist and reciprocalist approach to theology and politics that substitutes for the dominance of market, state and technocracy the primacy of the social, the cultural and the relational. Fully-fledged early romantics like Blake, Shelley and Coleridge, with their German contemporaries Novalis, Hölderlin and Friedrich Schlegel, or their French ones Joseph Joubert, Chateaubriand, Maine de Biran and the young Victor Hugo, for all their idiosyncratic, diverse and periodic modes of political radicalism, actually refused impersonal pantheism just as much as they refused the worship of monstrous wilfulness. Instead, as Schlegel put it, they “lifted the veil of Isis” to reveal once more, in Blake’s words, the “countenance divine” which, in the daylight, “doth a human form display”. In this way they sought to re-enchant transcendence and thereby recover the archaic western wisdom in a more culturally-dispersed, imaginatively mediated and feeling-imbued idiom that could unite nobly esoteric teaching with openly popular appreciation.

16. 'IMAGES OF THE WORLD': ONTOLOGY AND HISTORY IN THE WORK OF HEIDEGGER, SCHMITT AND FOUCAULT

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The relationship between thinking and action, ontology and history is among the most controversial aspects of Martin Heidegger's work. Yet this 'dark side' of his oeuvre has inspired a fruitful series of conceptual and epistemological paths to rethink our mode of being-in-the-world. It will suffice to mention here Foucault's archaeological method and his idea of "historical *a priori*." However, the expression "history of the Present" ["*Geschichte der Gegenwart*", GA 2: 519] makes its first, 'strong', appearance already in *Being and Time* (§ 76), where Heidegger enigmatically interrogates the "*historiological disclosure of history*" [*die historische Erschließung von Geschichte*] and its ontological structure that is "*rooted in the historicity of Dasein*" [*in der Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins verwurzelt*, GA 2: 518]. But in what sense are history and ontology intimately related? What is the relationship between historical necessity and future potentialities, between fate and world? In this paper, I aim at rethinking these epochal questions through a comparative analysis of the work of Heidegger, Foucault, and Schmitt. For, I believe that these authors offer three different – yet theoretically contiguous – 'images of the world' that might help us to re-interpret the relation between theory and praxis, necessity and contingency, fate and freedom. This analysis is not an end in itself but seeks to develop, on the basis of the second section of *Being and Time*, a different conception of archeology, of its epistemological and normative significance for history and the humanities.

17. EARTH, WORLD AND THE WINDS OF CHANGE: A CONTRIBUTION TO AN UPDATING OF HEIDEGGERIAN THINKING

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The major themes of Heideggerian analysis are well enough known: the deepening crisis of a nihilism in which meaning and belonging are eroded; the substitution of the technical fix for meaningful relations as the site for social organisation and development; and the spread across the planet of these two tendencies, which Heidegger identifies as essentially European and Greek in origin, with the Greeks imaged as the original colonisers of the Mediterranean, from Athens to Rhodes, from Cadiz to Lebanon. These processes are understood to be entangled in a philosophical transmission

which has failed to take up its own constitutive task: to affirm meaning and belonging and thus to respond to the question of the meaning of being. The first theme is an elaboration of that of Nietzsche, but without the affirmative moment in which the devaluation of devalued values is welcomed. The second theme is that of Marxist critique, but without the moment of emancipatory intent, in which the most expropriated are supposed to be in possession of an inspirational capacity for resistance and transformation in the interstices of disappropriation. The third theme effects the transformation of a genuine universalism, all people will be emancipated, into the false universal of globalisation for which enough money flies you out of any natural or political catastrophe.

Three questions can be posed to this analysis: the presumption that the origin of these tendencies is Greek and European may be the problem, not the salvific insight. For it presumes that the meanings and belongings, the conflicts and the aspiration of regions and continents other than those of the European inheritance are somehow epiphenomenal. The thought that the importation of categories developed for analysis of conditions in the European domain elsewhere blocks and stalls, rather than enabling and freeing up analysis and action remains to be addressed. Even the Foucauldian and Derridean critiques and attempted transformations of the Heideggerian legacy, in terms of governmentality and the proposed history of sexuality, in terms of philopolemology and hostipitality fail adequately to challenge this Eurocentrism. The presumption that the philosophical inheritance is one and indivisible underpins this localism, masquerading as universal, here taken to be the marker of globalisation: local privilege attaining global sway.

Here even the critiques of this inheritance proposed by Simone de Beauvoir and by Luce Irigaray, in part in response to the obvious masculinism, and partiality of the master discourses of Dasein and *Seinsgeschichte*, fail to disrupt the crypto-Christian prejudices of the inheritance: the Pope still necessarily male, and all the sons of God, priests, mullahs, and Chief Rabbis, still fetishised, and indistinguishable one from the other in their stolen authority. More promising perhaps are the inheritors of Heideggerian analysis who more directly explore the implications of their own partiality. In my analyses, I shall mobilise a certain Levinasian delimitation of philosophy, to make way for the address of inherited difference, and certain themes from Donna Haraway, to deepen the divide between the human and other animals legitimated by religions of the book, and by the Heideggerianism, which has not yet questioned its relation to those religious commitments.

The end of the book and the beginning of writing is the slogan under which this critique can be given a further twist. The notions of Spectral Nationality (Pheng Cheah), of intersectionality and of terrorist assemblages (Jasbir Puar), take up and empower the Derridean analyses of hauntology, *differance* and auto-immunity. It is not so much the writings of Jacques Derrida, but a certain willingness to invite in the unexpected, and to

renounce spurious authority, which remains to be inherited. Finally it may be through an encounter between accounts of Occidentalism (Said) and a critique of post-colonial rationality (Spivak) with these more restricted notions of universality and globalisation that the ingenious substitution of local interests, in the name of the universal ‘philosophy’ takes place.

18. BEING-WITH, BEING-HISTORICAL, BEING-DISPOSABLE: REFLECTIONS ON TECHNICS, VIOLENCE AND DISPOSABILITY IN THE GLOBAL ERA

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Inspired by the ontological possibilities in the thought of Being-with [*Mitsein*] and of a broader coexistential ‘hermeneutics of facticity’ in Heidegger’s early writings and lectures for thinking about, and against, undeniable manifestations of disposability in the contemporary age, one might encounter Heidegger’s experimental, in-progress, texts written in the midst of WWII with difficulty. On the one hand, there are critical possibilities in the attempt to understand the abandonment and forgetting of being, which leads Heidegger to posit certain question-worthy links between metaphysics and the dynamics and manifestations of technology and violence, possibilities which problematize the technological era as one in which the human establishes itself simultaneously as the one and only standard and as resource. On the other hand, Heidegger denounces in these same texts the notion that, in his earlier works, one might find, or at least develop, a co-existential optics that might guide us on posing and rethinking the question concerning disposability. This article engages with the opening and apparent closure of these possibilities, informed both by Heidegger’s thinking and also by decolonial accounts of disposability and violence.

19. WHAT ARE PUBLIC MOODS?

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References to ‘public moods’ are common in everyday explanations of social events, yet social scientists almost never invoke the notion. By first looking at moods that pertain to individuals, this paper suggests ways in which the notion can be clarified. There are three main metaphors with the help of which we think about moods moods as ‘bodily stance’, as ‘atmosphere’, and

as ‘attunement’. More than anything moods are ways in which our bodies fit into a certain social and physical environment. Moods are not affective states that we ‘have’ as much as affective states in which we find ourselves. This is the case also for public moods. A public mood is not the aggregate of individual opinions or feelings, but a shared affective state in which society as a whole finds itself. There are two viable versions: the public understood as a unified collective agent or as a result of process of socialization.

20. MODERNITY, METAPHYSICS, AND COLONIALITY

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According to Martin Heidegger, Cartesian dualism and the collapse of the distinction between Being and beings serve as a bedrock for the forgetfulness of Being in Western modernity and for the reification of both humanity and the apparently external world, both of which fall prey to the dominion of technology. Heidegger’s analysis brilliantly synthesizes and creatively expands on other critiques of modernity, particularly those from such apparently different figures such as Nietzsche and Husserl. There are virtues and limits to his account that are also virtues and limits of 19th century German critiques of modernity. One of such limits is found in what could be described as an indifference and willful neglect, rather than forgetfulness, of coloniality. This indifference is built into the modern sciences as well as in philosophical discourses that offer a critique of modernity and the sciences. This presentation aims to offer key coordinates in the critique of modernity, understood as modernity/coloniality, in conversation with Heideggerian arguments about the age of metaphysics, modern subjectivity, technology, and modern science.